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REGIONAL APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL SECURITY

Letter dated 29 April 1991 from the head of the Chinese delegation addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission

I have the honour to transmit to you a working paper entitled "China's basic position on regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security". The Chinese text and its English translation are enclosed herewith.

I would be grateful if you could kindly arrange to have this text circulated as a document of the Disarmament Commission under item 6 of the agenda of this session.

(Signed) Hou Zhitong
Head of the Chinese delegation
to the 1991 session of
the Disarmament Commission

READEX FICHE

Annex

REGIONAL APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL SECURITY

China's basic position on regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security

Working paper submitted by China

1. Appropriate regional disarmament activities initiated and participated by States when specific conditions of their own regions permit and require are conducive to the relaxation of tension in the regions concerned, and to regional peace, security, cooperation and development, and will have a positive bearing on other regions' as well as global efforts for peace, security and disarmament.

2. Progress in regional disarmament depends firstly on the specific circumstances and conditions of the region involved. Therefore, States within the region should make efforts in the following aspects to promote regional disarmament on the basis of adherence to the purposes and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter:

(a) The right of States to choose, in the light of their national conditions, their own political, economic and social systems should be respected;

(b) States should respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and refrain from aggression against each other and interference in each other's internal affairs;

(c) States should seek peaceful settlement of their disputes through consultations and dialogue without using or threatening to use force;

(d) States should not seek an armament and military spending level that exceeds their legitimate defence requirements;

(e) States, big or small, strong or weak, are entitled to participate, on an equal footing, in consultations on and settlement of matters concerning their region.

3. Regional disarmament efforts can hardly proceed in isolation and are naturally conditioned and affected by the extraregional environment. Therefore, it is highly necessary to create favourable external conditions and environment to promote regional disarmament. In this respect, extraregional States, particularly States possessing the largest arsenals, should render active cooperation and support to regional disarmament efforts.

(a) They should respect the independence, sovereignty and security of States in regions concerned, and refrain from any threat, interference, subversion and aggression against these States by any means and under whatever pretext;

(b) They should work as soon as possible towards a fair and reasonable settlement of regional conflict by political means and towards the removal of regional hot-spots and let States concerned and their people decide their own destiny;

(c) They should drastically reduce and ultimately eliminate completely all forms of their military presence and dismantle their military bases and installations in the regions concerned. Troops thus reduced should be disbanded and weapons, equipment and facilities thus reduced should be disposed of by means of destruction or conversion. They should neither be adapted to other weapon systems or redeployed in other regions, nor transferred or sold to other countries.

4. Security environment, armament levels, historical background and cultural tradition vary from region to region. States in the same region are also heterogeneous in terms of social system, ideology, history and culture. Therefore, in examining the question of regional disarmament, this reality should be recognized and respected and full consideration given to the following basic principles:

(a) Regions where serious military confrontation and high armaments concentrations exist should take the lead in concluding and implementing agreement on drastic arms reductions, establishing a military balance at lower levels of forces and eliminating the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action;

(b) Various regions should, proceeding from their specific conditions and characteristics, at the initiative and with the participation of the States concerned, reach agreement and adopt measures on regional disarmament acceptable to those States on the premise of undiminished security for all;

(c) Regional disarmament agreements should not jeopardize the legitimate security interests of other regions and States, and should conform to the basic norms governing international relations;

(d) Extraregional States should respect all regional disarmament agreements conducive to peace and security and refrain from any activities harmful to the implementation of these agreements.

5. Specific regional disarmament measures and steps should and can only be initiated and agreed upon through consultations and negotiations by States within the region. In this connection, there does not exist any modal applicable to all regions. Based on this understanding and in the light of the practice and experience of the international community, the following measures may be taken:

(a) Nuclear-weapon-free zones may be established according to the actual conditions of a region through consultations and by voluntary agreement of the States concerned. Nuclear-weapon States should respect the status of such zones, undertake corresponding obligations and ensure not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against these zones;

(b) Peace zones defined and determined freely by the States concerned therein may be established under appropriate conditions;

(c) The establishment of an appropriate nuclear non-proliferation regime should be encouraged and facilitated by States in the region. They may also declare not to acquire, develop, produce and use weapons of mass destruction, and may prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects;

(d) Confidence-building measures and measures concerning the exchange of and openness and transparency in objective information on military matters suitable to conditions of various States of a region may be adopted through voluntary consultations in the light of the specific environment and political, military and security conditions of various States of the region;

(e) States in a region, while taking into account the need of ensuring their security and keeping necessary defensive capabilities, may take, by agreement, appropriate actions in the field of conventional disarmament so as to ensure that their armaments are used solely for defensive purposes;

(f) Regional disarmament can be effected step by step. In order to increase confidence, reduce tension, remove conflict and strengthen security, the States concerned may, in the light of their specific conditions and need, enhance dialogue and consultations and adopt practical measures bilaterally, including such confidence-building measures in the military sphere as to refrain from any military exercise directed against each other along the border, limit the scale, frequency and geographical scope of military exercises at border areas, inform each other of the scale, frequency and geographical scope of military exercises and major troop movements in border areas, invite each other to observe military exercises, exchange annual plans on relevant military activities, agree upon areas free from military exercises. This can create conditions for possible further regional arrangements;

(g) Without compromising the legitimate defensive capabilities of various States, while fully taking into account their legitimate needs in this connection and their weapons manufacturing and production capacity, the possibility of working out specific measures concerning reasonable regulation and restriction of weapon transfers should be explored;

(h) In the course of regional disarmament, existing regional mechanisms should be used as much as possible and the role of United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament should be brought into play.

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REGIONAL APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL SECURITY

Working paper submitted by Ecuador*

1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

   1.1. Influence of regional disarmament on international peace and security.

   1.2. Influence of a global security environment on regional disarmament.

2. CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION BY REGIONS.

   2.1. Identification of regions historically defined.

   2.2. Elements that integrate a group of States within a region.

3. REVIEW OF EXISTING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND SYSTEMS IN VARIOUS REGIONS.

   3.1. Classification of viable regional security arrangements or systems.

   3.2. Identification of characteristics of the regional security arrangements or systems.

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* Working non-paper of the delegation of Ecuador on the basis of its statement before the Working Group, on 25 April 1991, and the working paper of the Chairman.

3.3. Identification of factors which could lead to the accomplishment of such security arrangements.

3.3.1. Interregional factors.

3.3.2. Extraregional factors.

4. PRINCIPLES OF REGIONAL DISARMAMENT.

4.1. Sovereignty of States.

4.2. Setting priorities in a disarmament process.

4.3. Confidence-building measures.

5. REGIONAL DISARMAMENT AGENDA.

5.1. Influence of international peace and security in the adoption of a regional disarmament agenda in each region.

5.2. Bilateral relations between States of a region and the adoption of a regional disarmament agenda.

5.3. Items to be included in a regional disarmament agenda (if issues mentioned in 5.1 and 5.2 would not interfere in the process).

- Confidence- and security-building measures;
- Establishment of zones of peace;
- Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- Arms limitation and disarmament agreements;
- Regulations on international transfer of arms and military technology;
- Reduction of military budgets;
- Reduction of military forces.

6. WAYS AND MEANS TO PROMOTE A REGIONAL DISARMAMENT AGENDA. (If issues mentioned in 5.1 and 5.2 would not interfere in the process).

6.1. Confidence-building processes.

6.2. Extraregional participation.

6.3. Forums.

6.3.1. Forums on peace, security, cooperation and development.

6.3.2. Participation of regional organizations.

6.3.3. Regional agreements in specific areas of arms limitation or disarmament.

(a) Provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

(b) Bilateral agreements within a region.

(c) Multilateral agreements.

7. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN A REGIONAL APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL SECURITY.

7.1. Establishing, where appropriate, mechanism for verification of compliance with regional treaties and agreements.

7.2. Enhancing the United Nations regional security early warning system(s).

7.3. Enhancing existing regional commissions as an integral part of efforts for promoting regional peace and security.

7.4. Enhancing the existing United Nations regional centres for peace, disarmament and development.

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REGIONAL APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL SECURITY

Regional disarmament and global security: elements for a regional approach to arms control and disarmament within the context of global security

Working paper submitted by the Netherlands*

AIM

The aim of the present paper is to suggest principles and measures which could be taken into account for the purpose of regional arms control and disarmament efforts. These proposals are made drawing on practical experience in various regions of the world and recognizing that they must be considered in the context of global security.

The adoption of regional arms control and disarmament measures is one of the most effective ways for States to contribute to the general arms control and disarmament process. Therefore, attaining stability and security for all the participating States should be the main objective of this process, resulting in an appropriate balance of forces in all regions.

I. GENERAL REFERENCES

Besides the Charter of the United Nations, especially Chapter VIII on Regional Arrangements, the following general references have, inter alia, been taken into account.

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* On behalf of the twelve States members of the European Communities.

1.1. Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission's 1990 session: "The regional approach to disarmament is one of the essential elements in global efforts" (para. 11 of the report of the Working Group on agenda item 8). 1/

1.2. General Assembly resolution 45/58 M of 4 December 1990, adopted by consensus: "Regional disarmament, including confidence-building measures".

1.3. Guidelines for confidence-building measures adopted by the Disarmament Commission in 1988. 2/

1.4. Regional disarmament centres (General Assembly resolution 45/59 E of 4 December 1990).

II. BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR A REGIONAL APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL SECURITY

The search for regional security structures and measures to encourage stability and peace should be pursued in order to enhance security at the lowest possible level of military forces, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and promoting economic and social progress.

The regional approach to arms control and disarmament should take into account legitimate national defence requirements in accordance with the right of self-defence as laid down in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is in the interest of regional security if States base their defence policies on military capabilities sufficient for individual or collective self-defence.

Regional and global disarmament

2.1. Arms control and disarmament achievements at regional level may, alongside bilateral and multilateral negotiations, facilitate progress towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The regional approach to disarmament is one of the essential elements in global efforts to achieve peace and security.

Any regional provision should take into consideration interdependence in that regard between neighbouring regions. Arms control and disarmament agreements between regions would also enhance global security.

Any regional measure should also take into account the relationship between security in the region and international security as a whole.

The international community should respect and support regional arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Regional stability and characteristics

2.2. Regional arms control and disarmament measures should contribute to, and increase, stability within a region.

Regional disarmament efforts should interact positively with bilateral and other regional political initiatives to build confidence and to overcome imbalances and tensions in one area from spreading to other areas. Positive results in one region should not have harmful effects on others.

Initiatives should take into account particular characteristics of each region and should lead to stability and security for all the participating States. The States in the region should themselves define appropriate and specific conditions for the security of their region, as well as conditions for ensuring their security in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and generally recognized principles of international law.

One essential principle would therefore be to give priority, in any regional disarmament process, to the elimination of the most destabilizing military capabilities and imbalances.

Rights of participating States

2.3. Regional arms control and disarmament provisions should not violate the principles of sovereignty, political independence and unity of any State.

Regional arms control and disarmament efforts should build on the principle of sovereign equality for the States in the region. States will have to respect each other's right to choose freely and to develop their political and security systems in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

Peaceful settlement of disputes

2.4. Regional arms control and disarmament should be consistent with the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The obligation of States to refrain from the threat or use of force is vital for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in a region.

Transparency

2.5. Transparency and openness are essential to progress in regional arms control and disarmament. They should also include the need to increase awareness of military activities and capabilities, as well as objective information on them, in order to enhance predictability and reduce the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation. Transparency, openness and restraint are of the utmost importance for the creation of a climate conducive to realistic measures dealing with arms transfers.

Practical steps and undiminished security

2.6. Arms control and disarmament arrangements can be pursued more effectively through an approach whereby States within the region engage in pragmatic and specific practical steps, if necessary using a phased approach.

However, such an approach must respect the principle of undiminished security for all participants at all stages in the process.

Respect for international obligations

2.7. Regional arms control and disarmament should be advanced by the commitment of all participants to fulfil in good faith obligations under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant treaties, agreements and international law. Implementation of arms control and disarmament measures must not be impaired by circumvention.

III. POSSIBLE MEASURES TO FACILITATE AND ACHIEVE REGIONAL DISARMAMENT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL SECURITY

Initiatives from within the region

3.1. Initiatives for regional arms control and disarmament arrangements should come from within, and be developed by, the region itself.

Whilst initiatives from outside can act as catalysts, regional States concerned must be in a position to support such initiatives in order to impart the necessary momentum to make progress.

Agreement among all States of the region itself is essential to ensure the success of such arrangements.

Mutual confidence

3.2. To build and to strengthen mutual confidence is a long-term task for any regional group of States.

Arms control and disarmament measures can contribute to the building and strengthening of confidence. However, such measures cannot be fully successful if considered alone; complementary political cooperation in pertinent areas would enhance the building of confidence.

3.3. Development of a regional approach

To develop practical steps towards increased regional security, those elements which are the main source of instability and a threat to peace and security within the region should be identified.

Regional arms control and disarmament requires a common approach on security goals by States involved.

Confidence-building measures, designed to contribute to transparency and predictability of military activities, could be considered within the regions, at bilateral and multilateral levels, in order to facilitate further agreements.

Such measures as notification of large-scale military activities and exchange of military data, within the context of the particular region, could reduce the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation.

Elimination of destabilizing military capabilities

3.4. In the framework of regional arms control and disarmament agreements, emphasis should be put on the elimination of the capacity to launch surprise attacks and large-scale offensive military operations.

Arms transfers

3.5. Disarmament measures in one region should not lead to increased arms transfers to other regions.

Verification

3.6. Appropriate verification measures for the implementation of regional arms control and disarmament agreements and treaties are essential.

Declarations

3.7. Declarations of non-use of force or threat of force can play a part in creating a climate of confidence based on mutual respect and aimed at ensuring better relations founded on solidarity and cooperation.

Regional mechanisms

3.8. Establishment of regional mechanisms or arrangements to further the cause of prevention of conflicts and peaceful settlement of disputes should be considered.

In addition, the United Nations may be able to play a greater role in the dissemination of information on regional arms control and disarmament measures.

Regional centres could make substantial contributions in this regard.

Informing the Security Council

3.9. In accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council should be informed of "activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security".

Notes

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/45/42), para. 34, p. 24.

2/ Ibid., Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3), para. 41, pp. 22-32.

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ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, DISARMAMENT AND OTHER RELATED FIELDS

Science and technology for disarmament

Working paper submitted by the Netherlands*

1. The wording used in the title of agenda item 7 places science and technology in a very broad context. Notwithstanding the merits of a wide-ranging consideration of all these aspects, the Twelve believe that, in considering the disarmament-related applications of science and technology, Working Group IV of the United Nations Disarmament Commission will identify the most easily accessible areas of consensus as well as avenues leading to practical results.

2. United Nations General Assembly resolution 45/61, adopted by consensus on 4 December 1990, calls upon Member States and relevant intergovernmental organizations to intensify and extend activities to use scientific and technological achievements for disarmament-related purposes. By submitting the present working paper, the Twelve wish to contribute to follow-up action by the United Nations Disarmament Commission which, during the current session, for the first time has the opportunity to elaborate on resolution 45/61.

3. In approaching the specific questions before the Commission, it is useful to recall first some basic considerations:

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* On behalf of the 12 States members of the European Community.

(a) The pursuit of scientific and technological development in itself is a neutral process; only the uses to which the products of science and technology are put are negative or positive;

(b) Given the provisions contained in chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, including the inherent right of self-defence, military applications of science and technology are not necessarily negative;

(c) Some of the most obvious examples of the positive potential of science and technology lie in their application to disarmament-related purposes:

(i) Scientific and technological developments can contribute to confidence-building by providing the means to achieve greater transparency in military matters;

(ii) They have a major role to play in the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements, e.g. by providing arms disposal techniques that are safe, transparent, cost-effective and environmentally sound;

(iii) They can substantially enhance the possibilities for unilateral or cooperative verification of compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements;

(iv) They might positively influence processes of conversion of the military industry into civilian production.

4. Some examples and suggestions for scientific and technological applications in the arms control and disarmament fields are:

(a) The use of modern technology in verifying compliance in accordance with the specific verification provisions of each agreement;

(b) The possibility of establishing a global seismological network as one of the means to monitor nuclear explosions (seismological verification, Geneva Group of Experts);

(c) Seismic sensors to identify movements of heavy conventional equipment in certain areas;

(d) Chemical weapon verification, e.g. use of the mass spectrometer as well as other analytical equipment for detecting chemical weapon development, production, stockpiling and use, in particular in the course of on-site inspections under a chemical weapon convention;

(e) Special non-removable tags to mark and identify equipment that is subject to arms control;

(f) Satellite monitoring of relevant equipment and forces;

(g) Open skies project: open skies would supplement both national technical means for data collection, as well as data exchange and verification rules as laid down in arms control agreements. The quality of sensor packages would be determined by their composition and performance data. Possible technical means could be framing optical cameras; panoramic optical cameras; electro-optical systems; infrared sensors; infrared linescanner and synthetic aperture radar;

It is hoped that other examples will be provided by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research study on new technical means for the verification of arms control, which is currently under preparation.

5. The Twelve are confident that Working Group IV of the 1991 session of the Disarmament Commission will succeed in exploring collectively further avenues of international cooperation in the use of scientific and technological achievements for disarmament-related purposes. The fruitful results of the United Nations Conference on New Trends in Science and Technology: Implications for International Peace and Security, held at Sendai, Japan, in April 1990, and of the United Nations Conference on Conversion: Economic Adjustments in an Fra of Arms Reductions, held in Moscow in August 1990, may guide us in tackling this subject.

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THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, DISARMAMENT AND OTHER RELATED FIELDS

Working paper submitted by Colombia

1. Science and technology are the great dynamic force which drives the race for arms of ever-increasing destructive capacity. This, together with the fact that thousands of scientists sucked in by the arms industry are helping to make weapons more effective, to the point that far more economic and human resources are devoted to military research and development than to research for the purposes of economic development and social welfare, alone provide sufficient reasons to fear for the fate of the human race and to seek a change in the priorities evident in today's world.

2. Science and technology have made a fundamental contribution to the configuration of every aspect of the modern world, including both those which we enjoy and those which we fear. At the same time, science and technology, depending on the way in which they are applied, the ideals which guide them, the policies of States and the behaviour of the scientific community, can and must be a dominant factor in the building of a better world. A conscious rearrangement of international priorities with respect to science and technology is therefore required, with a view to addressing the basic needs of the world population.

3. Science and technology are playing an increasingly influential role in prospects for economic growth and social welfare. Bearing in mind the enormous technological inputs required to hasten the process of development, the tremendous asymmetry between research and development activities for military purposes and similar activities for civilian purposes is becoming much more marked, as is the asymmetry between the technological capacities of the developed and the developing countries. That is why there is an urgent

need for the developing countries to promote cooperation, both among themselves and with the developed countries, in order to enhance their capacities in the various technological and scientific fields which make it possible to foster economic and social development at the same time as responding to the new challenges arising as a result of technological innovations in the developed countries.

In this connection, the group of eminent persons convened by the Secretary-General last October to discuss peace, development and the role of science and technology, recommended that the Centre for Science and Technology for Development should devote particular attention to the subject of converting military technologies for use in civilian activities and include that topic in its programme of work. Also, the United Nations Fund for Science and Technology for Development should allow the United Nations system to play a catalytic role in redirecting scientific and technological activities in the developing countries to conform with the development requirements of the 1990s.

4. Military research has led to the production of countless incredibly sophisticated weapons and systems which stimulate the arms race and maintain its momentum. These research and development projects create an upward spiral in the production of lethal and costly weapons, in which technological sophistication has come to be even more important than the mere quantity of arms. New scientific findings rapidly lead to technological discoveries which are immediately incorporated into new arms and weapon systems, where the pace of innovation is sharpened by the fear of lagging behind in technology. Scientific and technological progress thus creates an endless chain of actions and reactions which often far outstrip military strategies.

5. Military research reflects a disproportionate effort to ensure the destruction of potential enemies, which, in the long run, can contribute little or nothing constructive to the economy but which, nevertheless, has become an integral part of the world economic structure and is seen as one of the principal motors of economic growth and industrial progress. The conceptual flaw in this reasoning is that it provides no comparison with a situation whereby resources used in the military sector are directed to the civilian sector. Such links between military research and the economy do not alter the fact that the resources invested in military research represent a tremendous wastage of manpower, skills, talent and economic resources which, if redirected towards constructive ends, at the same order of magnitude, could transform the world economic structure for the benefit of all.

6. The links between military research and the economy warrant special consideration. It should be recalled that most basic scientific discoveries, when applied in practice, were used both to promote economic growth and for destructive purposes and that many, if not most, technologies are potentially useful in both the military and civilian sectors. This means that technological development, when successfully undertaken for economic reasons, may have civilian applications which will promote economic growth.

The United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development sets out an interesting approach to the subject: if it were true that military expenditure had the effect of stimulating the economy of the industrialized countries, growth should be more sluggish in those countries where military activities are of less importance; however, those countries in which military expenditure accounts for a high proportion of gross national product (GNP) are growing at a slower pace than those where the proportion is lower; Japan is a dramatic example of a country with low military expenditure and high growth and productivity rates; the economic success of the Federal Republic of Germany* during the post-war period points in the same direction.

It should be added that the effects of military expenditure on central economic planning, in terms of economic growth, as well as the effect on opportunities which stems directly from the military structures of the super-Powers, appear to be no less adverse than their effects on the free-market economy. In both cases, the economic damage caused by the escalation of the arms race is cumulative, and the more it is allowed to persist, the more difficult it will be to remedy.

7. If we adopt a coherent approach to the world of the future, it is possible that the economy may gradually be shifted away from the arms race towards a secure, just and sustainable world order. A prerequisite for such an approach would be universal acceptance of the need to link disarmament to development throughout the world. The devotion of such fantastic resources to military objectives and the complete harnessing of so many brains to destructive endeavours should weigh on the conscience of those who are, besides, aware of the dimensions of the tragic problem facing the third world. It should also be recognized that the situation of extreme poverty which affects a broad section of mankind would improve considerably if they had access to technologies considered basic in our day and age.

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* Through accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany with effect from 3 October 1990, the two German States have united to form one sovereign State. As from the date of unification, the Federal Republic of Germany acts in the United Nations under the designation "Germany".

8. Research has transformed the nature of war and considerably increased its dangers and the possibilities for destruction. The weapons and methods of destruction used against man and his environment, such as carpet bombing and other modern methods of war aimed indiscriminately at military, civilian and environmental targets, might perhaps appear rational to their inventors but, from the human point of view, warrant only condemnation. Ethical value judgements against unnecessary brutality have given rise to international laws for the regulation of war - the Geneva Conventions. However, it remains clear - and recent history confirms - that in this era of rapid technological progress there is a serious decline in respect for those provisions of international law which regulate war.

9. The development of new technologies in military production. Arms producers see the arms market as a way of recouping the research and development costs involved in their own arms production. Innovations and increasing sophistication in the weapons sold in their turn create greater competition both among arms producers and among those who sell and buy them. This competition also promotes an ever more sophisticated arms race and heightens the threat to international peace and security.

10. Science and technology have produced custom-made arms and military equipment for use by terrorists, mercenaries and other international criminals. Plastic explosives and other highly explosive materials, automatic weapons and expensive military equipment are freely sold in an international market open to drug traffickers and criminals of all types with sufficient purchasing power. Furthermore, mercenaries, supported by the latest technologies, train these criminals in the most sophisticated techniques of terror, usually with a view to achieving the political and social destabilization of a particular country.

11. Easy access to the sophisticated arms and military equipment market, together with the illicit transfer of technology for the production of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, have demonstrated the need for agreement on specific international control and interdiction measures to prevent the propagation of such weapons, until such time as those countries which produce them take an irreversible decision to eliminate them entirely. This will clearly not be possible as long as the military Powers continue to see transfers of arms and technologies for the production of the most up-to-date weapons as a legitimate means of obtaining political and economic advantages, nor as long as regional Powers continue to depend on military strength to resolve disputes with their neighbours.

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

the tremendous asymmetry between research and development activities for military purposes and similar activities for civilian purposes is becoming much more marked, as is the asymmetry between the technological capacities of the developed and the developing countries. That is why there is an urgent need for the developing countries to promote cooperation, both among themselves and with the developed countries, in order to enhance their capacities in the various technological and scientific fields which make it possible to foster economic and social development at the same time as responding to the new challenges arising as a result of technological innovations in the developed countries.

In this connection, the group of eminent persons convened by the Secretary-General last October to discuss peace, development and the role of science and technology, recommended that the Centre for Science and Technology for Development should devote particular attention to the subject of converting military technologies for use in civilian activities and include that topic in its programme of work. Also, the United Nations Fund for Science and Technology for Development should allow the United Nations system to play a catalytic role in redirecting scientific and technological activities in the developing countries to conform with the development requirements of the 1990s.

4. Military research has led to the production of countless incredibly sophisticated weapons and systems which stimulate the arms race and maintain its momentum. These research and development projects create an upward spiral in the production of lethal and costly weapons, in which technological sophistication has come to be even more important than the mere quantity of arms. New scientific findings rapidly lead to technological discoveries which are immediately incorporated into new arms and weapon systems, where the pace of innovation is sharpened by the fear of lagging behind in technology. Scientific and technological progress thus creates an endless chain of actions and reactions which often far outstrip military strategies.

5. Military research reflects a disproportionate effort to ensure the destruction of potential enemies, which, in the long run, can contribute little or nothing constructive to the economy but which, nevertheless, has become an integral part of the world economic structure and is seen as one of the principal motors of economic growth and industrial progress. The conceptual flaw in this reasoning is that it provides no comparison with a situation whereby resources used in the military sector are directed to the civilian sector. Such links between military research and the economy do not alter the fact that the resources invested in military research represent a tremendous wastage of manpower, skills, talent and economic resources which, if redirected towards constructive ends, at the same order of magnitude, could transform the world economic structure for the benefit of all.

6. The links between military research and the economy warrant special consideration. It should be recalled that most basic scientific discoveries, when applied in practice, were used both to promote economic growth and for destructive purposes and that many, if not most, technologies are potentially useful in both the military and civilian sectors. This means that technological development, when successfully undertaken for economic reasons, may have civilian applications which will promote economic growth.

The United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development sets out an interesting approach to the subject: if it were true that military expenditure had the effect of stimulating the economy of the industrialized countries, growth should be more sluggish in those countries where military activities are of less importance; however, those countries in which military expenditure accounts for a high proportion of gross national product (GNP) are growing at a slower pace than those where the proportion is lower; Japan is a dramatic example of a country with low military expenditure and high growth and productivity rates; the economic success of the Federal Republic of Germany* during the post-war period points in the same direction.

It should be added that the effects of military expenditure on central economic planning, in terms of economic growth, as well as the effect on opportunities which stems directly from the military structures of the super-Powers, appear to be no less adverse than their effects on the free-market economy. In both cases, the economic damage caused by the escalation of the arms race is cumulative, and the more it is allowed to persist, the more difficult it will be to remedy.

7. If we adopt a coherent approach to the world of the future, it is possible that the economy may gradually be shifted away from the arms race towards a secure, just and sustainable world order. A prerequisite for such an approach would be universal acceptance of the need to link disarmament to development throughout the world. The devotion of such fantastic resources to military objectives and the complete harnessing of so many brains to destructive endeavours should weigh on the conscience of those who are, besides, aware of the dimensions of the tragic problem facing the third world. It should also be recognized that the situation of extreme poverty which affects a broad section of mankind would improve considerably if they had access to technologies considered basic in our day and age.

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* Through accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany with effect from 3 October 1990, the two German States have united to form one sovereign State. As from the date of unification, the Federal Republic of Germany acts in the United Nations under the designation "Germany".

8. Research has transformed the nature of war and considerably increased its dangers and the possibilities for destruction. The weapons and methods of destruction used against man and his environment, such as carpet bombing and other modern methods of war aimed indiscriminately at military, civilian and environmental targets, might perhaps appear rational to their inventors but, from the human point of view, warrant only condemnation. Ethical value judgements against unnecessary brutality have given rise to international laws for the regulation of war - the Geneva Conventions. However, it remains clear - and recent history confirms - that in this era of rapid technological progress there is a serious decline in respect for those provisions of international law which regulate war.

9. The development of new technologies in military production. Arms producers see the arms market as a way of recouping the research and development costs involved in their own arms production. Innovations and increasing sophistication in the weapons sold in their turn create greater competition both among arms producers and among those who sell and buy them. This competition also promotes an ever more sophisticated arms race and heightens the threat to international peace and security.

10. Science and technology have produced custom-made arms and military equipment for use by terrorists, mercenaries and other international criminals. Plastic explosives and other highly explosive materials, automatic weapons and expensive military equipment are freely sold in an international market open to drug traffickers and criminals of all types with sufficient purchasing power. Furthermore, mercenaries, supported by the latest technologies, train these criminals in the most sophisticated techniques of terror, usually with a view to achieving the political and social destabilization of a particular country.

11. Easy access to the sophisticated arms and military equipment market, together with the illicit transfer of technology for the production of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, have demonstrated the need for agreement on specific international control and interdiction measures to prevent the propagation of such weapons, until we get those countries which produce them to take an irreversible decision to eliminate them entirely. This will clearly not be possible as long as the military Powers continue to see transfers of arms and technologies for the production of the most up-to-date weapons as a legitimate means of obtaining political and economic advantages, nor as long as regional Powers continue to depend on military strength to resolve disputes with their neighbours.